This paper examines whether real estate …rms can avoid price competition when properties in the vicinity are priced by allies. An oligopoly model with di¤erentiated products generally suggests that real estate …rms engage in price competition with their spatially closest rivals. Yet they can raise property prices when the market share of their allies increases. To test this prediction, a spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive disturbances, including a share of allies in the vicinity, is estimated using data on the prices of residential condos in central Tokyo. The model prediction is supported by the empirical results. In our dataset, the magnitude of the market share on the property prices increases with the expansion of the size of the spatial market.
INTRODUCTION
Residential real estate prices are extremely expensive in some of the world's largest cities. The existence of barriers to market entry could be one of the reasons for such high prices. According to Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005) , however, real estate construction is a highly competitive industry. Using the 1997 Economic Census reports, they showed that there are more than 1000 establishments among the multifamily builders in New York City, and approximately 75 percent of them are relatively small enterprises with fewer than 10 employees. This indicates that the real estate industry is not controlled by a few large …rms. Thus, it is unlikely that real estate …rms have any market power to set property prices. Extremely high housing prices in the great cities could re ‡ect strong demand for housing because of large populations along with a limited supply due to government regulation (Kanemoto, 1997; Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 2005) .
On the other hand, Chen, Clapp, and Tirtiroglu (2011) assumed that spatial markets are inherently monopolistic because each location in space is unique. Based on a monopolistic competition model, they demonstrated theoretically that real estate …rms can set a price higher than marginal cost. A database of prices of new high-rise condos in two districts in Shenzhen was used to con…rm their hypothesis. They suggested that this market is one of monopolistic competition because one or two dozen developers dominate the market. Indeed, their empirical results appear to support this hypothesis. Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) assumed that appraisal information is less likely to be accurate when markets for heterogeneous properties tend to be thin. In such a situation, bargaining power plays a crucial role in determining property prices. Then, real estate …rms with relatively substantial market power over space can set property prices.
According to the industrial classi…cations used in the 2009 Establishment and Enterprise
Census (EES) issued by the Statistics Bureau and the Director-General for Policy Planning of Japan, real estate …rms that sell condos are classi…ed into "Sales agents of buildings and houses and Land subdividers and developers". The 2009 EES reveals that the number of establishments in this group in Tokyo is 2,344, and approximately 80 percent of them have fewer than 10 employees. Similar to New York City, real estate …rms in Tokyo tend to face …erce competition. Yet, the Real Estate Economic Institute reported that the market for new condos in the Tokyo metropolitan area has been oligopolized. 1 In 2010, approximately 40 percent of new units were produced by the major seven …rms. 2 A unit market share, de…ned as unit sales (the number of transactions) of a …rm divided by total market unit sales, however, cannot be used to con…rm that the condo market is oligopolistic. As noted by Beck, Scott, and Yelowitz (2012) , because real estate markets are local, a metropolis-level market structure may not be dispositive. Therefore, this paper focuses on the new condo market in small local areas in central Tokyo and empirically tests whether real estate …rms can use market power to avoid a certain level of price competition. We present a conceptual framework: an oligopoly model under product di¤erentiation is applied to the residential real estate industry to explain strategic interaction among …rms in terms of real estate pricing. We de…ne a small local market for each condo unit and calculate a share of an ally …rm inside the market. Both the prices of nearby properties and the market share of the ally are assumed to have an impact on the pricing decisions of the …rm. The results indicate that a price war occurs when rival …rms decrease their property prices. Yet, the large market share of the ally in the neighborhood creates a tendency to avoid price competition. The reason is straightforward: such a situation is similar to those arising from the collusive behaviors of oligopoly …rms.
Our analysis uses a database of new condo prices in central Tokyo from 2005 to 2009 containing 599 observations. This database is unique because it contains the average price of units in each new condo, the location of the site, and also the name of the …rm that sells the units. Although the actual shares of a¢ liated …rms are far from the oligopoly outcome, our empirical results based on a spatial autoregressive model with spatial autocorrelated disturbances (SARAR), which is mainly advocated by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) , suggest that 1 The 2014 National Condominium Market Report, https://www.fudousankeizai.co.jp/ (accessed June 23, 2015) .
2 Major 7 is a website for new condos run by the following major real estate …rms: Sumitomo Realty & Development Co., Ltd., Daikyo Incorporated, Tokyu Land Corporation, Tokyo Tatemono Co., Ltd., Nomura Real Estate Development Co., Ltd., Mitsui Fudosan Residential Co., Ltd., and Mitsubishi Jisho Residence Co., Ltd. Details are available at https://www.major7.net/ (accessed June 23, 2015) . oligopolization in the spatial real estate market appears to induce a price increase. 3 Moreover, the magnitude of market share on property prices increases with the size of the spatial market.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Real estate …rms compete on price because properties are close substitutes (Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 2005) . At the same time, real estate properties are generally di¤erentiated in a spatial dimension (Chen, Clapp, & Tirtiroglu, 2011) . In this sense, we employ a Bertrand model with di¤erentiated products to analyze the local real estate market. The strategic interaction among real estate …rms in terms of property prices in a spatial market can be derived from this model. Empirically, a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model is an appropriate model to represent this idea because it captures the strategic interaction among decision-makers in geographical spaces (Brueckner, 2003) . The parameter of spatial lag in the dependent variable measures how an optimal strategy of rival …rms in close proximity a¤ects the …rm's optimal strategy. Examples of this from the literature include models of tax competition among local municipalities (Brueckner & Saavedra, 2001; Gérard, Jayet, & Paty, 2010) , spatial price competition in the retail gasoline market (Pinkse, Slade, & Brett, 2002; Pennerstorfer, 2009) , and models of price interaction among local hospitals (Mobley, 2003; Mobley, Frech III, & Anselin, 2009 ).
Several studies that estimate real estate price models have also used spatial statistical techniques (Anselin, 1988; Can, 1990 Can, , 1992 Can & Megbolugbe, 1997) . These papers included the weighted average of selling prices of nearby properties to explain house prices. Past studies have considered spatial dependence due to adjacency e¤ects, which are externalities associated with the absolute location of the structure. One explanation of adjacency e¤ects is that residential real estate sellers can use close substitutes in a neighborhood as a reference in assessing property prices. Yet, unlike the studies mentioned above that consider strategic interdependence among players, the papers that use spatial statistical techniques to examine housing prices have received little attention in terms of strategy in the real estate industry.
Our interest is how market concentration a¤ects property prices. The approach used in this paper is close to that used by Mobley, Frech III, and Anselin (2009) and Pennerstorfer (2009) , which incorporated the degree of market competition into the SAR model. If the coe¢ cient of the spatial lag in the dependent variable is signi…cantly positive, the …rm's optimal price necessarily decreases as its rivals' optimal prices decrease. This indicates that local markets tend to plunge into price competition. However, the optimal price has a tendency toward avoidance of intense price competition when the market share of the …rm is high. For example, Mobley, Frech III, and Anselin (2009) 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this section is to develop a conceptual model that formalizes our intuition. In the following empirical section, we estimate a SAR model to test for spatial price competition in a real estate market. We attempt to estimate the following linear form of the SAR model:
where p i is the price of a property i (i = 1; ; N ), p j is the price of a nearby property j (j = 1; ; N ), is an unknown parameter for the spatial lag (autoregressive) that captures spatial interaction in the dependent variable, X i is a vector of housing traits that has a vector of unknown parameters , and i is the error term. The w ij represents a given spatial weight, which re ‡ects the distance between properties, so that w ij takes a nonnegative value. We assume w ij = w ji and de…ne w ij = 0 if i = j. The latter assumption implies that
does not contain the own-price p i . Furthermore, we incorporate a parameter measuring the share of the ally's properties i , where i 2 [0; 1], into the above equation to examine whether real estate …rms can avoid price competition when this index rises. 4 Thus, is an unknown parameter that we focus on in this paper.
We de…ne a spatial market as follows:
(Spatial market) A certain space around property i is de…ned as the spatial market of property i.
Suppose that there are N i properties in the spatial market of property i, where
This implies that N N i properties are substantially far from property i; accordingly, the spatial weights of these properties'prices are also zero. Moreover, suppose that M i properties among N i properties, where M i N i , are priced by the ally …rms. Then the unit market share
Now let us develop a conceptual model that can drive Eq. (1). As mentioned in the previous section, we apply a Bertrand oligopoly model with heterogeneous products to the real estate market because the model can examine the idea of price competition, and can also capture the characteristics of the property di¤erentiation in the spatial market. Assume that a property i competes with other properties in the spatial real estate market. Let us denote the demand for property i as h i . The demand function depends on the own-price p i , the vector of housing traits X i , and the linear speci…cation of price p j , which is multiplied by the spatial weights
where w i is a spatial weight vector w i = (w i1 ; ; w iN ), and p is a price vector p = (p 1 ; ; p N ) 0 .
Following Mobley (2003) , we consider a case where the demand function h i (p i ; W i p; X i ) is linear. Assume that the demand function follows the law of demand: the demand h i falls when the own-price p i rises. This assumption implies that @h i =@p i < 0. Assume also that properties are gross substitutes. Namely, if w ik > 0 (k = 1;
; N , and i 6 = k),
where P k = w ik p k , otherwise @h i =@p k = 0. All properties have identical average and marginal construction costs; namely, the cost of producing output h i is assumed to be a linear function, ch i , where c is a positive constant. The pro…t from property i then becomes:
If a …rm that supplies the property i considers the other property k to be a rival, then 
Eq.
(1), namely the SAR model, is a linear form of Eq. (3).
The primary variables of interest are p k and i . Di¤erentiating the reaction function for property i's price with respect to the other property k's price we obtain: @p i =@p k > 0. Namely, the reaction function is positively sloped. The impact of market share on property i's price depends on the sign of (p k c). Bertrand …rms can charge prices above marginal cost when their products are di¤erentiated; thus, p k is larger than c. Then @p i =@ i > 0. This suggests that property i's supplier can internalize a certain amount of the pro…t when the number of allies increases; consequently, the supplier aggressively raises p i .
Let us denote the equilibrium property price as p i . One of the objectives of this paper is to examine the e¤ect of i on p i . To examine this, we assume that the slope of the reaction function can be written as @p i =@p k = w jk , where > 0. In particular, we attempt to estimate 5 More precisely, we should specify a vector i = ( i1; ; iN ) representing the state of cooperation, with elements de…ned by, ik = 1 if the properties i and k are allies and zero otherwise (Bresnahan, 1987) . In our empirical context, however, i in Eq. (1) reduces the number of explanatory variables substantially compared with i. the scalar , the parameter for the spatial lag of the dependent variable. Then, we obtain the following: and ii is the minor of matrix formed by removing the i-th row and column. Eq. (4) suggests that the total e¤ect (@p i =@ i ) is j ii j = j j times larger than the partial e¤ect (@p i =@ i ).
Let us ignore higher-degree terms of that are greater than the square of because j j < 1 is the usual case in the SAR model, and 2 (0; 1) in our context (Kelejian & Robinson, 1995) . Then we can rewrite Eq. (4) as the following approximate expression:
where the numerator of the …rst term on the right-hand side is larger than its denominator
The partial e¤ect indicates that property i's supplier raises its own property's price when i increases, given the prices of other properties. However, the suppliers of other properties also raise their property prices in reaction to this increase because the other reaction functions are positively sloped. Then property i's supplier again raises its own property's price; namely, p i increases more than the partial e¤ect in the equilibrium. This additional impact is described by a multiplier e¤ect in Eq. (5).
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS The empirical model
Let us represent Eq. (1) in matrix notation:
where p = (p 1 ;
; p N ) 0 is a vector of the prices, which are logarithmically transformed in the estimation stages, and is a vector of error terms. The estimate of the SAR parameter re ‡ects the slope of the reaction function. The conceptual model suggests that the sign of is positive.
On the other hand, the estimated parameters of housing attributes, which are included in the vector X, are variables that can shift the reaction function. The vector = ( 1 ; ; N ) 0 re ‡ects the strength of allies within spatial markets. The parameter appears to capture our main hypotheses. It suggests that the sign of is positive.
The spatially autoregressive dependent variable is represented as W p, where W is an N N spatial weight matrix, N is the number of observations. The diagonal elements of the spatial weight matrix are set to zero, and by convention, the row elements are standardized such that they sum to one for all types. The structure of the spatial weight matrix depends on how we de…ne the spatial market, which is discussed later.
If there are any spatially dependent omitted variables, the disturbance process is likely to be:
where is the SAR error parameter, and u is an uncorrected but heteroscedastic error term.
Because our data are averages, the variance of u is assumed to depend on the number of residential units in the condo building. In addition to this, u tends to become heteroscedastic because of the unobserved spatial heterogeneity (Anselin, 1988) . Because the variance of u is determined by several factors, the unknown scedastic function of u is assumed. When both SAR parameters and must be considered, a generalized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) procedure is used to estimate the SARAR model, which is given by Eqs. (6) and (7), while allowing for unknown heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term (Kelejian & Prucha, 2010) . 6 6 Chasco, Le Gallo, and López (2018) proposed the scan test to check the spatial groupwise heteroscedasticity of the spatial models. Although they checked the heteroscedasticity and tried several speci…cations in their example, they could not specify the heteroscedasticity. To cope with the problem, they estimated the model using the method proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (2010) , which is robust to spatial heteroscedasticity.
Data and competition in the central Tokyo condo market
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) reports new housing starts every month. There are four types of housing: custom-built detached houses, readybuilt houses, rental dwellings, and company-provided housing. Ready-built houses are divided into two categories: condo units (individual home units in condo buildings) and detached houses. The prices of condo units are the easiest to compare because condo units are the most standardized among the four types of housing (Tajima, 2003) . In the following subsections, we thus select condo units as a sample of residential properties.
The data for this paper were collected by the Marketing Research Center (MRC) Co., Ltd. 7 The database contains the characteristics of newly constructed condo buildings and their units in the Tokyo Metropolitan area, which includes Saitama, Tokyo, Chiba, and Kanagawa prefectures. For instance, the name of the company that constructs the condo, the height of the condo, and the total number of residential units in the condo building are included. In addition, this database includes the exact location of the condo, de…ned by longitude and latitude using the world geodetic system. The database, however, only contains the representative condo unit's price as well as its attributes because condos are typically composed of individual residential units of di¤erent sizes. In this paper, we consider the representative condo unit as the average condo unit in the building. Overall, the database seems to be appropriate for examining our hypothesis using a spatial econometric model. In this paper, we focus on The sample used in the analysis has the following characteristics. The number of observations, which equals the number of condo units, in Tokyo in the full period is 3102. Of these, 23.6 percent (731 units) are in the 10 wards of central Tokyo, which is 13.6 percent point lower than the value from MLIT. Restricting the sample to those for which all necessary information was available reduced the number of observations to 709. Of these 709, 15.5 percent (110 units) were produced by joint ventures (JV), in which a group of …rms builds one condo. In the following two subsections, the observations related to JV are removed from the sample, and so the sample is reduced to 599 observations. In the last subsection, however, the observations related to JV are added.
As mentioned, the database provides information on the …rm's name. We de…ne an ally as follows.
(De…nition of an ally) A nearby condo unit that is in a di¤erent condo building is an ally if the condo building is produced by one's own …rm and a …rm that have formed a capital alliance.
We de…ne the following three cases as capital alliances: the …rm belongs to an a¢ liated group, the …rm belongs to an a¢ liated company, or the …rm agrees to a merger in the future.
According to the de…nition of the ally, we obtain 122 di¤erent …rms.
To construct W p, we de…ne the spatial market in the third section as follows.
(Spatial market) 0 A circle with a y-kilometer radius around the condo unit i is de…ned as the spatial market of the condo unit i.
The de…nition implies that each observation (condo unit) has an individual spatial market.
All units that are observed within a y-kilometer radius are assumed to obtain the i-th row of W . Because home-buying households tend to search for dwellings within a small local area, we report the estimation results based on circles with a two-kilometer (ca. 1.2 miles) radius. Some potential buyers, however, have a way of looking for houses over a wide range of the spatial markets. Therefore, we also examine the case of a four-kilometer (ca. 2.5 miles) radius. 8 To check whether the results are sensitive to the speci…cation of W , we test the spatial dependence of the model using six di¤erent types of spatial weight matrices. As detailed earlier, the row elements of all the spatial weight matrices are row normalized. Let us denote the distance between the condo units i and j as d ij . The former three types (W 1 , W 2 , and W 3 ) are based on an inverse-distance (1=d ij ) (see Table 3 , which is shown below). We assume that real estate …rms only consider condo units that are built in close proximity to their rivals.
Therefore, all condo units that are observed within a y-kilometer radius are included in W 1 .
One concern is that real estate …rms may not consider condo units that are priced in di¤erent years from those of rivals' units. To deal with this issue, the elements of W 2 are set equal to zero if properties are priced in di¤erent years. We also investigate a case where real estate …rms may consider condo units that are built in the same or previous years to their rivals: the elements of W 3 are set equal to zero if properties are priced in later years. Instead of the inverse-distance, the latter three types (W 4 , W 5 , and W 6 ) are based on a radial distance between the units (see Table 3 ).
In this paper, the strength of the alliance ( i ) is measured by the market revenue share: each …rm's sales are divided by total market revenue. Before discussing i in our context, we de…ne some notations. Let us consider a condo unit i, which is a member of the real estate market with a set of properties N = f1;
; N g. As above, we de…ne the spatial market of the condo unit i. Similar to the third section, among N i units, which exist within the spatial market, M i units will be supplied by the allies. The …rm's sales of units within the condo building that condo unit i (i 2 N ) belongs to are written as s i (s i = p i g i , where g i is the number of units in the condo building; namely, sales are determined on a value basis), while total market sales in the spatial market around condo unit i are written as:
where A i is a subset of N consisting of a unit a (i 6 = a) that is priced by the ally, and R i is a subset of N consisting of a unit r (i 6 = r) that is priced by the rival. Namely, total market sales are the sum of sales of the condo unit i (the …rst term of the right-hand side), sales of the allies (the second term), and sales of the rivals (the third term). Then the market share is:
(Share of an ally)
In practice, when there are no allies in the vicinity (the numerator is equal to zero), i takes the value zero percent, whereas when all neighbor units are provided by allies (the numerator is equal to the denominator), i takes the value 100 percent. 9 Table 1 presents the variable de…nitions for both the dependent and explanatory variables; Table 2 presents the sample statistics, although it does not report statistics for some of the dummy variables. We control for the structural attributes of the condo units; namely, average living area, the number of rooms, the density of the condo, the number of elevators, the construction material, the height of the condo, and the number of units in the condo. To control for the neighborhood of the condo, distance to the nearest railway station is included.
Although not reported in Table 2 , we also add 13 train line dummies, namely four Japan Railway lines and nine Tokyo Metro subway lines, 10 geographical dummies comprising 10
Tokyo wards, and seven zoning code dummies. In addition to geographical categories, four year dummies for 2006 to 2009 are included, but they are not reported in Table 2 . Unobservable neighborhood characteristics apart from these variables are controlled for using the spatial autoregressive error terms. In the estimation stage, we take the logarithm of the price, lag price, and living area. In addition to the revenue market share, we also tested two alternative formulations for the share of the ally: unit market share and relative market share. None of these alternative speci…cations fundamentally changed our qualitative results. See the discussion in the last subsection.
Tokyo. Relatively low residential condo prices are geographically concentrated in the east side of central Tokyo. On the other hand, relatively high prices tend to be observed in the south, especially in the southwest of central Tokyo. Namely, house prices are spatially autocorrelated: high (low) condo prices in one location are associated with high (low) prices in surrounding locations. The SAR parameter may capture this spatial tendency.
The average share in Table 2 indicates that the spatial condo market in the 10 wards of central Tokyo is not oligopolistic but rather highly competitive. The average share in the case of the two-kilometer radius is 5.6 percent. The average share further decreases in the case of the four-kilometer radius. These descriptive statistics reveal that the real estate industry is highly competitive even in a small local area. The correlations between share and the log price in Table 2 are positive but weak. 10 In the following subsections, we attempt to con…rm whether the market share has a signi…cant impact on residential prices holding other factors constant.
Diagnostic tests
In this subsection, we employ the speci…c-to-general approach for the speci…cation of the empirical model (Florax, Folmer, & Rey, 2003; Anselin & Rey, 2014; Elhorst, 2014) . Table   3 presents diagnostic tests based on the residuals obtained from OLS without the variable Lag price. The results of Moran's I in Table 3 indicate that spatial autocorrelation in the error term is present, regardless of the weight speci…cations. To test whether the nonspatial model should be extended with spatial interaction e¤ects for the dependent variable or for the error term, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test statistics are calculated. The LM lag and the LM error indicate that both the spatial lag and the spatial error coe¢ cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in all cases. Both the robust LM lag and its error remain highly signi…cant, indicating that the SARAR model must be considered. Table 4 presents heteroscedasticity tests, such as the BP test, proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1979) , the modi…ed Glejser (MS) test, proposed by Machado and Santos Silva (2000) , and the Im test, proposed by Im (2000) . The latter two tests are robust under weak assumptions of the disturbances. As mentioned in the …rst subsection of this section, to conduct these tests, we use the variables that tend to be related to the heteroscedasticity, such as the number of units in the condo and the location of the condo. The latitude and longitude, which indicate the location of the condo, are used to capture heteroscedasticity caused by spatial heterogeneity.
As shown in Table 4 , they are all signi…cant, and the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected. Normality tests are also conducted, such as the JB test, proposed by Jarque and Bera (1987) , and the adjusted JB test, proposed by Urzúa (1996) . They are signi…cant, as indicated in Table 4 , and the null hypothesis of normality is also rejected. Both the heteroscedasticity and normality tests indicate that the disturbances follow nonnormal distributions, and their variances are heteroscedastic; consequently, we must consider these issues. Elhorst (2010) suggested that an e¤ective criterion for selecting a weight matrix is the loglikelihood function value, proposed by Stakhovych and Bijmolt (2009) , if spatial dependence is strong. Following Stakhovych and Bijmolt (2009), we estimate the SAR model ( = 0 in Eq. 7), the spatial error model (SEM) ( = 0 in Eq. 6), and the SARAR model for six spatial weight matrices using the maximum likelihood method. Table 5 tabulates the log-likelihood of those models. We choose W 1 as our benchmark model because the log-likelihood function value is the highest among the six di¤erent types of spatial weight matrices within the same radius for three di¤erent speci…cations. 11
Empirical results
From the GS2SLS parameter estimates of the SARAR model, shown in Table 6 , where the signs of the coe¢ cients are the same across the two speci…cations of the spatial weight matrix, the hypothesis that a spatial error is not present is signi…cantly rejected. After considering the spatial error, the coe¢ cient for the pricing of condo units in the closest-neighbors area 1 1 Stakhovych and Bijmolt (2009) recommended their approach based on Monte Carlo experiments of SAR and SEM models under the assumption of normality of the error terms; however, we estimate the SARAR model under nonnormality of the disturbances u. These results must be taken with caution because the model and the nonnormality of the disturbances were not examined in the prior study. The selection of the weight matrices for the SARAR models under nonnormality of the disturbances remains for future research.
(the variable Lag price) has a statistically signi…cant positive impact on the real estate price.
As suggested in the conceptual framework, the reaction function has a positive slope. The empirical results imply that price-cutting competition is likely to exist. When rivals decrease the prices of units, but a real estate …rm does not, the real estate …rm loses customers; thereby, the real estate …rms also have a tendency to decrease prices.
On the other hand, a higher share of allies, which is our main focus, leads to higher prices of condo units, indicated by the signi…cantly positive sign of the share of the ally (the variable Share). Although the actual shares of a¢ liated …rms are far from the oligopoly outcome, the empirical results suggest that oligopolization in the spatial real estate markets has a way of avoiding price competition.
To capture the total e¤ect-how an exogenous increase in market share in the spatial market raises the prices of condo units in the equilibrium-let us measure the semi-elasticity of the property price with respect to i . Following Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) , this can be simply written as:
where \ log p i is the equilibrium …tted value of condo unit i, and^ and^ are the estimated value. 12 Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) called (1 ^ ) 1 a spatial multiplier. Following this equation, we …nd that, in the two-kilometer radius case, the semi-elasticity (the total e¤ect) is at 0.4: a one percent point increase in the share increases property prices by 0.4 percent.
To evaluate the results quantitatively, we calculate the predicted e¤ect of a one percent point increase in market share on the average property price. Given that the average property price in our database is approximately 60,000,000 yen, a 0.4 percent increase translates into a house value increase of 240,000 yen. In the four-kilometer radius case, the semi-elasticity is 1.0. 13 A similar exercise …nds that a 1.0 percent increase translates into a house value increase of 600,000 yen. In sum, in our dataset, expanding the size of the circle of the spatial market 1 2 This corresponds to the average total impact suggested in LeSage and Pace (2009). 1 3 We examine a polar case where all units are assumed to obtain the spatial weight matrix (full radius case). The estimated coe¢ cients of the spatial lag and the share of ally have signi…cant and positive signs. The semi-elasticity is 1.8, which is the largest of the three cases. from the two-to the four-kilometer radius results in larger values of the semi-elasticity. In the case of the short-distance radius, potential home-buying households may relatively readily …nd substitute units by searching for dwellings outside this space when a supplier of a condo unit increases the price. On the other hand, relatively elastic values of the semi-elasticity indicate that buyers tend to face di¢ culty in searching for alternative dwellings when we de…ne the long-distance radius.
In terms of the other variables, our results are as follows. Both the variables Living area and Elevator seem to attract demand; consequently, they have a signi…cant positive e¤ect on property prices. The dummy variable One room also matters, being signi…cantly and positively associated with the prices. This suggests that, given the size of the dwellings, home-buying households would prefer one room to two rooms or more. In general, the prices decrease signi…cantly for properties located far from the station (the variable Distance). On the other hand, the estimated results demonstrate that FAR, SRC, and Large-scale are unrelated to property prices because these variables di¤er insigni…cantly from zero.
Robustness checks
In this subsection, we conduct several tests to see whether our empirical results are robust.
In the following robustness checks, we adopt the same procedure as shown in the previous subsections, except Panels B and C of Table 11 . Only the main variables are reported in the following tables.
We change the de…nition of the spatial weight matrix. As mentioned in the second subsection, real estate …rms may consider the priced year of rivals' units. Panel A of Table 7 demonstrates the results based on W 2 . Although the average numbers of units in spatial markets are quite small, the results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6 . As shown in Panel B of Table 7 , the alternative speci…cation W 3 also yields similar results to our benchmark case. 14 In Table 8 , the n-nearest neighbor condos create the spatial weight matrix. The average distance of units in spatial markets is 0.4 kilometers for the …ve-nearest neighbor condos, and 0.6 kilometers for the 10-nearest neighbor condos, which are shorter than the two-kilometer case. As expected, the results demonstrate that the coe¢ cients of the lag price and share are signi…cantly positive. The semi-elasticities, however, are much smaller than our benchmark estimation results. These may re ‡ect the fact that the buyers can readily …nd substitute properties outside the spatial market when we only consider the n-nearest neighbor condos.
Overall, comparing Table 6 with 8 suggests that, in our dataset, the larger the size of the spatial market, the greater the impact of the market share on the property prices.
We estimate two alternative formulations for the market share of the ally in addition to our benchmark model. In Panel A of Table 9 , we use market share calculated using the number of transactions, (M i =N i ) 100%, as we considered in the conceptual framework. The estimated results show qualitatively the same pattern as our benchmark estimation results. In Panel B of Table 9 , we use the relative market share. In this paper, we de…ne the relative market share as the …rm's market share divided by the largest rival's market share. Therefore, the relative market share is 100 percent if the …rm's market share is the largest in the spatial market, otherwise, it is less than 100 percent. The estimated results show qualitatively the same pattern as our benchmark cases. These results give us con…dence that the revenue market share in Table 6 is an appropriate index for capturing our hypothesis. Therefore, we again use the revenue market share in the following robustness checks.
We must address spatial heterogeneity, one source of which is the …xed characteristics that vary with location. To consider this issue, Panel A of Table 10 includes the interaction of the zoning dummy and year dummy, while Panel B of Table 10 adds the interaction of the ward dummy and year dummy. These may allow us better to control for the potential spatial heterogeneity issue to some degree. As shown in Panels A and B of Table 10 , these alternative speci…cations demonstrate that the coe¢ cients of interest are quantitatively similar to those in our benchmark results. Our main empirical …ndings seem to be not unduly in ‡uenced by …xed location characteristics.
So far, we have considered the share of the ally (the variable Share) as exogenous. However, it might be correlated with the error term. For example, market share may di¤er from its true value because we use only newly constructed condo units. Regarding market segmentation, if we had examined other types of dwellings such as newly constructed detached houses, then prospective buyers would have had a larger number of substitutes. 15 The estimator of ally share tends to be biased downward in this case, if one were not to consider the potential for measurement error inherent in our calculation. Alternatively, let us suppose that for larger real estate …rms with a large amount of capital, many employees may charge di¤erent property prices compared with those of smaller …rms. However, we cannot obtain the amount of capital and number of employees from our database. Therefore, the error term tends to contain information on enterprise class. Colwell and Marshall (1986) suggested that …rm size has a positive and signi…cant impact on market share. If one were to neglect the positive relationship between ally share and enterprise class, the estimator of ally share is biased upward.
To account for such a potential endogeneity problem, Panel A of Table 11 simply incorporates the major seven …rms dummy into the estimation equation because these …rms may proxy large-scale enterprises in the Japanese residential real estate industry. In our dataset, 170 units out of 599 units are priced by the major seven …rms. A unit of major …rms has somewhat higher market shares than other units: 10.2 percent in the two-kilometer radius case and 8.0 percent in the four-kilometer radius case. The coe¢ cients of lag price are positive and signi…cant, as expected. The coe¢ cients of Major 7 are positive and signi…cant as well, indicating a price premium associated with brand name. These …rms provide a condo with luxury attributes; thereby attracting demand, and can raise their own-price. Contrary to expectation, the coe¢ cient of share becomes insigni…cant in the two-kilometer radius case. The insigni…cant sign may be observed because there is a positive correlation between the market share and the major seven dummy (corr: = 0:4). The four-kilometer radius case, however, indicates that market share has a statistically signi…cant positive impact on the real estate price, suggesting that our prediction seems still to be valid even when we consider the in ‡uence of major …rms. We must pay attention to the result that the semi-elasticities are smaller than in Table 6 . Namely, controlling the in ‡uence of large-scale enterprises has a tendency to mitigate the overestimation issue. Panel B of Table 11 estimates the SARAR model with an additional endogenous variable proposed by Drukker, Egger, and Prucha (2013) . We calculate HHI for each condo unit, and use it as the instrumental variable of ally share. HHI a¤ects ally share because this measure includes the same formula for share as in Eq. (8) 
However, HHI is unlikely to be correlated with unobserved factors a¤ecting the price of condo units. This is because …rms tend to care about their own share, rather than overall market concentration. 16 The results demonstrate that the semi-elasticities are larger than those in the benchmark model, particularly in the four-kilometer radius case. This suggests that our benchmark model may su¤er from a potential measurement error issue. Panel C of Table 11 combines Panels A with B of Table 11 . Similar to the two-kilometer radius case in Panel A
of Table 11 , the coe¢ cient of share is not signi…cant at the conventional level. The estimated results in the four-kilometer radius case, however, are quantitatively similar to those in our benchmark model. Comparing Panel C with B of Table 11 , we …nd that the major seven …rms dummy tends to mitigate upward bias, which arises from the prospect of the omitted variables.
As a result, the semi-elasticities in Panel C of Table 11 become somewhat smaller than those in Panel B of Table 11 .
Finally, the observations involving JV are added to the sample. However, we only consider the names of the …rms listed …rst because generally the …rst …rm on the list contributes the largest amount to a condo investment. For example, suppose that a JV comprises three real estate …rms that are listed as C Buildings, A Real Estate Development, and B Estate. We then assume that the condo is built by C Buildings. Panel A of Table 12 suggests that our hypothesis seems to be valid even though we include the observations involving JV. We also regard JV as independent suppliers. For example, suppose there was a JV where C Buildings is listed …rst. Then, we assume that the condo was built by the C Buildings JV. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 12 , indicating that the coe¢ cients of interest are quantitatively similar to those in Table 6 .
CONCLUSION
The residential real estate markets are characterized by a large number of …rms; accordingly, real estate industries engage in …erce price competition. However, real estate markets are very local, so local-level market structure information is bene…cial. Motivated by this, we examined the impact of market concentration on property prices in localized real estate markets.
A Bertrand oligopoly model with di¤erentiated products was applied to the real estate markets. A price response function that depends on the nearby property prices and share of the ally was obtained from this conceptual model. Comparative statics suggested that real estate …rms can charge high residential prices if the ally's share in the neighborhood increases.
We empirically attempted to con…rm whether real estate …rms have any market power to set property prices, adding the ally share into the spatial autoregressive model, which can capture the price response functions. The spatial weight matrix was linked to spatial real estate markets. That is, we constructed a circle around each property and de…ned this space as the spatial markets of the dwelling. In the estimation stage, we considered cases of two-and four-kilometer radii in the 10 wards of central Tokyo. Although the actual shares of a¢ liated …rms are far from the oligopoly outcome in the local market, our empirical results indicated that real estate …rms can raise the price of properties to some extent when their shares increase exogenously. Moreover, the extent to which the market share a¤ects the property prices tended to increase with the expansion of the size of the spatial markets. We must account for the fact that even a small percentage increase in price represents a large amount of money to home-buying households because the price of a condo unit is frequently high in central Tokyo.
Although we used several robustness checks, there are still ancillary items of note in the current analysis. First, our dataset includes only newly constructed condo units, which may cause attenuation bias on the share of the ally as discussed in the last subsection of the empirical part. We can construct proper measures of market share if we can collect data on other types of dwellings such as newly constructed detached houses. Second, our dataset does not contain information about the potential home-buying households. The size of the search area generally depends on the characteristics of the households. Acquiring information on homebuyers enables us to create more precise spatial weight matrices. Third, the reaction function has the potential to be in ‡uenced by the surrounding environment of a rival condo unit when the potential home-buying households consider them. In such a case, the spatial Durbin model (Anselin, 1988) or general nesting spatial (GNS) model (Elhorst, 2014) , which incorporates spatially lagged independent variables, appears to be more accurate for examining our hypothesis. Namely, the SARAR model tends to su¤er from omitted variables bias if we exclude the spatial dependence in the independent variables (LeSage & Pace, 2009; Elhorst, 2010) . 17 These items remain for future research.
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1 7 We incorporate the spatial lag of Distance and the spatial lag of Zoning into the benchmark model, and we estimate the GNS model. The empirical results suggest that the semi-elasticity is 0.3 in the two-kilometer radius, while it is 1.1 in the four-kilometer radius. These results are similar to those of the SARAR model in Table 6 . The log-likelihood function values are reported 1 : = 1/ , if the unit j is observed within a y-kilometer radius, and 0 otherwise 2 : = 1/ , if the unit j is observed within a y-kilometer radius and it is priced in the same year, and 0 otherwise 3 : = 1/ , if the unit j is observed within a y-kilometer radius, and it is priced in the same or previous years, and 0 otherwise 4 : = 1, if the unit j is observed within a y-kilometer radius, and 0 otherwise 5 : = 1, if the unit j is observed within a y-kilometer radius and it is priced in the same year, and 0 otherwise 6 : = 1, if the unit j is observed within a y-kilometer radius, and it is priced in the same or previous years, and 0 otherwise = 1/ , if the unit j is observed within a y-kilometer radius and it is priced in the same year, and 0 otherwise 3 : = 1/ , if the unit j is observed within a y-kilometer radius, and it is priced in the same or previous years, and 0 otherwise *** indicates significant at 1% 
